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William I. Myers (1891-1976) was one of the early agricultural economists who worked on 
problems of agricultural finance. He was appointed a full professor of farm finance at Cornell University 
in 1920. In 1932, Professor Myers was asked to prepare recommendations for a legislative program to 
solve the agricultural finance problems of those times. His proposals found approval from President­
elect Roosevelt, and his ideas formed the foundation for the creation of the Farm Credit Administration 
and the present Federal Cooperative Farm Credit System. Then, at the request of President Roosevelt, 
he was granted a leave of absence from Cornell in March 1933 to serve as assistant to Henry 
Morgenthau, then chairman of the Federal Farm Board. Morgenthau was appointed the first governor 
of FCA, and Myers became Deputy Governor. Then, when Morgenthau became Secretary of the 
Treasury in September 1933, Myers was appointed governor of the Farm Credit Administration. He 
served in that capacity until 1938 when he returned to Cornell University as head of the Department of 
Agricultural Economics. In 1943, he became Dean of the College of Agriculture serving until 1959.
The purpose of the W. I. Myers Memorial Lecture is to bring to this campus an outstanding 
agricultural finance economist to lecture on a timely topic. The lecture is sponsored by the Cornell 
University Department of Agricultural Economics as a part of its continuing emphasis in agricultural 
finance.
ABSTRACT
The value of a nation's currency is the most important price in its 
economy. Attempts to establish or maintain fixed exchange rates between 
countries are no longer possible due to the sheer size of international financial 
markets. The value of a nation's currency not only influences the relative prices 
between its tradeable and nontradeable sectors, it influences in very important 
ways a country relates to the rest of the international economy. The most 
significant effect of cyclical swings in exchange rates is the impact on trade 
where undervalued currencies amount to an export subsidy and an import tariff. 
U.S. foreign aid programs tend to strengthen the recipient country's foreign 
currency but hurt its development efforts. Needed stability in exchange rates can 
be achieved if countries pursue neutral monetary and fiscal policies.
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It is a distinct honor to deliver the 1992 Myers Memorial Lecture. I did not know 
Professor Myers personally, but I almost feel as if I did through my many 
conversations with Lowell Hardin, an alumnus of the Cornell Department of Agricultural 
Economics. Professor Myers was truly a person who made a difference. It is 
appropriate that his memory be honored with both a Memorial Lecture and a 
Professorship in his name.
In choosing the subject for a Lecture such as this it always helps to be lucky. 
Not everybody could foresee back in June when John Brake and I first discussed the 
possibility of my giving this lecture that by the time we reached this date the world 
would have passed through a major monetary crisis to help sensitize potential 
participants to the importance of the topic.
I have kept the same theme John and I agreed to back in June. However, I 
plan to spend some time discussing the events of the past several months as part of 
my presentation.
1992 W.l. Myers Memorial Lecture, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 
October 22, 1992.
Dean and Professor, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of 
Minnesota, Minneapolis.
My comments this evening are divided into four parts. The significance of 
monetary issues in the new configuration of the international economy is the first topic 
I take up. This is followed by a discussion of the global debt crisis of the 1980s and 
the drive to economic reform in the developing countries. Then we will consider the 
distortions created by foreign aid, and follow that with a discussion of the events in 
Europe in the past several months. At the end I will have some concluding 
comments.
The Significance of Monetary Issues
Anyone who went to Europe this past summer and paid three to four dollars for 
a common coke, or $16 to $18 for a modest breakfast, knows that monetary issues 
matter. Unfortunately, neither policy makers in this country nor those in Europe seem 
to appreciate that point. They try to obtain trade liberalization through the multilateral 
negotiations of the GATT without first obtaining more stable monetary conditions 
through reform of the international monetary system. They try to establish a new 
system of fixed exchange rates for Europe when the accumulation of 20 years of 
experience suggests it is not possible to do so. And the French continue to try to 
sustain a system of fixed exchange rates for their former colonies in Africa, despite the 
evidence that this system imposes severe hardship on particular countries in that 
system.
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It seems that policy makers are like academics. They like to do things by habit. 
If they did it in the past, that seems to be perfect justification for continuing to do it in 
the present and future, never mind that economic conditions have changed and new 
perspectives are needed.
In the case of our international monetary system, there continues to be a 
tendency in some parts, and especially in Europe, to worship the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange rate system that prevailed from the end of World War II up through the early 
months of 1973. There is a continued drive to return to the old system despite all the 
evidence that such a system is simply not feasible.
Why is a return to a fixed exchange rate system not feasible? The main reason 
is that international financial markets have become so large that it is no longer 
possible to fix exchange rates for the major currencies even if we want to. Total 
international financial flows dwarf international trade flows in today’s world.
International trade flows now run at about $3 trillion per year. International financial 
flows now run about 15 times that amount. The pressures from flows in those 
markets become absolutely huge. The experience of recent months has shown that it 
is not possible to fix the rate of exchange for major currencies even when Germany, 
Japan, and the United States all cooperate in efforts to do so.
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This is a serious case of institutional memory loss. The world had learned on 
an earlier occasion that fixing exchange rates was not feasible. The reason the United 
States forced the global monetary system to a system of bloc-flexible exchange rates 
back in 1973 was that despite best efforts to peg the value of the dollar after the 
devaluation of 1971, it was not possible to do so. It is sad that we have forgotten that 
important lesson in such a short period of time. There have been many wounded and 
injured from the recent monetary conflagration.
In addition to the above important point, three major issues need to be 
considered in taking our bearings on the consequences of monetary disturbances.
The first is that distortions in the values of national currencies are the equivalent of 
distortions to trade. An overvalued currency, for example, is equivalent to a tax on 
exports and a subsidy on imports. Those interested in agricultural development, 
whether here or abroad, will appreciate the significance of such distortions to sound 
development policy. Similarly, an undervalued currency, such as the Japanese long 
pursued, is equivalent to an export subsidy and an import tariff. From the perspective 
of agricultural development, distortions which either overvalue or undervalue national 
currencies are of the highest importance.
The second issue is closely related. When some parts of the markets of a 
global system are fixed and not allowed to adjust, the result is an increase in instability 
in the remaining part of the system. D. Gale Johnson made that point in the case of
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commodity markets some years ago. The same principle applies to foreign exchange 
markets. Thus, the fact that so many countries still try to fix the value of their national 
currencies contributes in very important ways to the observed instability in those parts 
of the foreign exchange system that are open and flexible.
The third issue has to do with the instability in foreign exchange markets. Many 
critics of flexible exchange rates point to the short term fluctuations in foreign 
exchange markets, and argue that that short term instability is damaging to trade 
because it increases risks and therefore transaction costs. However, the risk in 
transactions can be handled by hedging in the futures markets for foreign exchange. 
The real issue with the present system is not this short-term instability, but rather the 
fact that the values of national currencies experience long swings, on the order of six 
to eight years in length.
In the case of the U.S. dollar, for example, it experienced an almost continuous 
decline from 1973 to the end of 1979, a period of six years. Then it experienced an 
almost unprecedented rise from the end of 1979 to May 1985, another six year period. 
From that peak, the dollar has been in an almost continuous decline until the present 
time. The exception was a period towards the end of the 1980s, when the attempts 
by the Federal Reserve to dampen the economy caused the value of the dollar to rise 
for a number of years.
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The problem with these long swings is that they mask underlying comparative 
advantage. For example, by 1979, after the export boom of the 1970s, U.S. farmers 
thought they could compete with anybody in the world. After six years of 
unprecedented rise in the value of the dollar, however, many of them became 
persuaded they couldn’t compete with anybody. Both conclusions were wrong.
These large and extended swings in the value of national currencies also 
impose an almost continuous adjustment on the tradeable goods sectors, thus further 
sacrificing economic growth. In most countries, the agricultural sector produces a 
tradeable good. Most countries either export or import an agricultural commodity. 
Many do both.
To conclude, the emergence of huge, well-integrated international financial 
markets have contributed a great deal of monetary instability to foreign exchange 
markets. This instability creates distortions to international trade, and results in the 
sacrifice of a great deal of potential economic growth.
The Crises of the 1980s and the Drive to 
Economic Reform in the Developing Countries
Recall that the decade of the 1970s was a period of unprecedented economic 
growth in the global economy, especially among the developing countries. This 
economic expansion was fueled in large part by an explosion in the world’s supply of 
money. Monetary authorities in many countries pursued easy money policies to
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accommodate the shift in external terms of trade represented by the huge increase in 
petroleum prices. Moreover, there was a call by many observers of the international 
scene for the commercial banks to recycle the petrodollars that were accumulating in 
their accounts lest the international economy collapse.
The banks responded to this call for recycling with alacrity. Given the relatively 
high rate of inflation that ensued, interest rates in many cases were negative. Thus 
the developing countries were not being completely irrational when they absorbed 
these resources with enthusiasm. Moreover, they had other reasons for borrowing so 
extensively on the international capital market. The alternative was to undertake major 
devaluations of their currencies. Policy makers never like to devalue.
When OPEC engineered a second large increase in petroleum prices in 1979, 
the dollar went into a free-fall in foreign exchange markets. Paul Volcker, then chair of 
the Federal Reserve Board, hurried home from a conference in Europe to impose a 
draconian shift in U.S. monetary policy. In effect, the Federal Reserve Board decided 
that it would no longer print money to finance the already large deficit the U.S. 
government was running in its budget. Henceforth, the Treasury would have to 
borrow from the capital markets to finance the deficit.
We all know the results. Interest rates in the United States, and consequently in 
the rest of the world, increased dramatically. From negative real rates, they in a
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relatively short period of time increased to 22 to 23 percent in real terms. With the 
United States being the source of this large monetary disturbance, this country began 
to attract a large flow of capital from around the world. The result of this capital inflow 
was an unprecedented rise in the value of the dollar, one that, as noted above, 
extended over a six-year period.
For U.S. agriculture the combination of these two events was a near disaster. 
The large rise in real interest rates caused a collapse in asset values not experienced 
since the decade of the 1930s. The rise in the value of the dollar, together with the 
increases in support levels for commodity prices in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, choked off U.S. agricultural exports, further complicating things for our 
producers.
The problem was even worse, however, for the developing countries that had 
been borrowing with such enthusiasm from international financial markets. Much of 
their debt, which was mainly held in dollars, was in the form of short-term loans. In a 
very short period of time they were forced to refinance this debt at much higher rates 
of interest. Moreover, with the large rise in the value of the dollar, they had to give up 
more and more in terms of domestic resources to acquire the dollars to service their 
debt. In effect, the developing countries were hit with a double shock. Thus was born 
the international debt crisis of the 1980s and a long period of economic stagnation in 
many of the developing countries.
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As with many if not most painful events, there were some positive things that 
came from this period of crisis. For example, developing countries which had tended 
to tax their agriculture with highly overvalued currencies were forced to get their 
economic house in order by implementing more realistic exchange rate policies and 
generally undertaking economic reforms. This has been a painful process, and one 
that has stretched out for the greater part of a decade. Gradually, however, exchange 
rates have been realigned, national economies have been privatized, and economies 
in the developing world have been shifted to more market-oriented systems.
As we look to the international economy, the developing countries are now 
poised for a period of rapid economic growth. Countries such as Mexico and 
Argentina have undertaken major economic reforms and are already realizing the 
benefits. More generally, the share of export earnings from the developing countries 
that have to go to service international debt has declined to more realistic levels, and 
domestic economies are starting to recover.
This reform process has important implications for global agricultural markets. 
The major realignments of currency values in the developing countries have shifted the 
domestic terms of trade in those countries in favor of agriculture. In effect, policy 
makers are no longer imposing such large taxes on their agricultural sectors by 
means of overvalued currencies, nor are they subsidizing their imports of food and 
agricultural products by the same means. Agriculture is now positioned in these
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countries to come closer to realizing its comparative advantage. Producers have 
stronger incentives to produce.
The trade implications of these painful economic adjustments go in two quite 
different directions. With the shift in the domestic terms of trade in favor of agriculture, 
that sector can be expected to perform better and come closer to satisfying domestic 
markets. With more realistic exchange rates, producers in those countries should also 
be better able to compete in international markets, and the elimination of implicit 
import subsidies should cause imports of food and agricultural products to decline.
On the other side of the coin, the reform of economic policy should promote a 
more rapid rate of economic growth in these developing countries. The favorable shift 
in the domestic terms of trade should assure that the benefits of that economic growth 
are more widely spread among the poor, most of whom are concentrated in rural 
areas. The increase in per capita incomes should increase the demand for food. The 
key issue for U.S. producers will be whether these increases in demand will outpace 
the ability of domestic agriculture to respond with increased output. Although a 
detailed analysis of that issue is beyond our interests here today, the presumption is 
that domestic agriculture in those countries will not be able to respond in an adequate 
way and thus we should expect import demand in those countries to rise.
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Another factor at work to benefit the trade side of the picture is that the reform 
of domestic economic policies should attract an inflow of capital into those countries. 
This will help to make their currencies stronger in foreign exchange markets than they 
would otherwise be, and this in turn will provide incentives to import while at the same 
time taking some of the competitive edge off their exports.
To summarize, what we have seen is major economic reform efforts in the 
developing countries, driven largely by a large monetary disturbance. Most of these 
reform efforts are in the direction of making more efficient use of domestic resources, 
and in the direction of promoting domestic agricultural development. The limitations 
on agricultural development, on the other hand, will be imposed by the lack of 
capacity for agricultural research in those countries. Hence, as we look to the decade 
ahead, we should see growing markets for U.S. agricultural output, caveated only by 
our own ability to remain competitive in international markets.
It is worth noting in this context that our own monetary situation should work to 
the benefit of U.S. producers. We can expect to see the U.S. dollar remain weak in 
foreign exchange markets because of the huge international debt we have 
accumulated over the years. This should help U.S. agriculture remain competitive in 
international commodity markets.
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The Distortions of Foreign Aid
In light of the rather general criticisms of foreign aid programs by U.S. producer 
groups, it is somewhat ironic that these groups tend to benefit in important ways from 
foreign aid programs. In particular, they tend to benefit from the monetary aspects of 
that foreign aid.
The problem in this case is that much of the global effort in foreign aid is still 
directed to providing balance of payments support. Providing foreign aid in this form 
is counterproductive in that it tends to make the value of currencies in countries 
receiving such aid stronger in foreign exchange markets than they would otherwise 
be. Uma Lele and her colleagues have shown how important this effect can be in the 
case of many of the African countries. The foreign aid actually gives these countries 
relatively strong currencies, which is just the opposite of what they need in light of the 
other goals of development policy.
The effect of these policies is again two-fold. First, it helps keep the domestic 
terms of trade in those countries shifted against agriculture. This makes it difficult to 
develop the agriculture in countries that receive aid in this form. It also provides 
implicit import subsidies, which causes these countries to depend more on foreign 
sources of supply than would otherwise be the case. As long as foreign aid continues 
to take this form, we can expect to see the agricultural development efforts in those 
countries proceed at a slow pace, especially in light of their limited capacity for 
agricultural research.
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International foreign aid programs also impose another form of distortion in 
these countries. The international community, and especially the United States, 
continues to provide large amounts of food aid to the developing countries. This aid 
carries its own strong set of disincentives to the development of agriculture in those 
countries. Although the international community had at one time recognized these 
effects and was taking actions to minimize them, a new concept was coined and we 
are back at our old game. The new concept is the monetization of food aid, which 
means to sell it into the domestic market and recover the proceeds to use in support 
of government budgets and programs. As a little reflection will show, this sale into the 
domestic markets provides disincentives for domestic producers. Dumping by any 
other name is still dumping!
Let me conclude this section by noting that none of the above is to suggest 
that I am against foreign aid. To the contrary, if used in the right way, foreign aid can 
be in the best interests of U.S. producers since if the resources are used in the right 
way it can promote a more rapid rate of economic growth, generate increases in per 
capita incomes, and thus increase the demand for food and agricultural commodities. 
The foreign aid should be used to increase the productive capacity of the economy in 
these countries, however, and not for balance of payment support. Moreover, there 
are ways food aid can be used that will minimize the disincentive effects for domestic 
producers.
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Recent Events in Europe
The recent events in Europe once again illustrate the potentially severe 
consequences of failing to manage international monetary issues in a proper manner. 
The problems have arisen because of the misguided attempt to have a fixed exchange 
rate system, and a failure to recognize the consequences of such a system.
Recall that the countries of Western Europe have for some years been 
operating with a foreign exchange rate system that is described as "the snake." It 
receives this label because the values of national currencies are for all practical 
purposes fixed, but still allowed to fluctuate within a narrow band. When observed 
over time, the time path tends to trace out what looks like the wiggles of a snake.
The goal of this system was two-fold. The first was to impose monetary 
discipline on those members of the Community who would not otherwise be willing to 
impose such discipline on themselves. The second was to provide some degree of 
flexibility that would allow time to adjust to changing economic realities.
Some years ago the Europeans reached agreement to do what they describe 
as "complete the market." This meant that they decided to eliminate all remaining 
barriers to trade within the Community, as well as all barriers to the mobility of 
resources. The goal was to have completed this exercise by the end of 1992, and 
thus the program was referred to as EC-92.
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As this process proceeded, the issue of what kind of exchange rate system to 
have arose. Being by nature meddlers and interventionists, the Europeans decided to 
convert their national currencies to a common one. This in turn required that there be 
a central bank for Europe, and with a central bank goes the need for political 
unification. Political unification became attractive to some countries because it 
promised to give them some influence over the German Bundesbank, which under 
current circumstances has become central banker for the Community.
This drive for a central bank and political unification was a clear case of over­
reach. The Community could have all the benefits of full economic integration without 
having a unified monetary system. And it could have those benefits with a flexible 
exchange rate system. One need look no further than the trade between Canada and 
the United States to see how such a system can work. Both countries have flexible 
exchange rate systems, and the volume of trade across the border is the largest 
between any two countries in the world. Moreover, there are large flows of capital 
between the two countries as well.
An important point on this issue is that stability in exchange rates can be 
obtained by means other than fixing the rates explicitly. The key is to pursue neutral 
monetary and fiscal policies. In other words, national governments should pursue 
monetary policies that consistently attempt to stabilize domestic price levels and fiscal 
policies that tend to balance the budget from year to year. A combination of these
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policies will not fix the exchange rates at a given level, but it will keep them relatively 
stable over time. This is probably the best that can be done.
The unfortunate aspect to fixing exchange rates is that the system eventually 
breaks down, creating large monetary disturbances. It is out of such disturbances 
that protectionist pressures arise. In fact, the protectionist pressures begin to arise 
prior to the breakdown as one or more of the currencies becomes increasingly 
overvalued. The implicit import subsidy implied by such an overvaluation is what 
creates the pressures for protectionism.
To conclude this section, the attempt to establish a common exchange rate for 
the European Community will have significant effects on the domestic agriculture of 
the member countries. It will also have an important influence on trade flows and on 
pressures for protectionism. It would be better for all parties concerned if the 
Europeans were to change their current policy goals and go instead for a fully flexible 
exchange rate system.
Concluding Comments
The value of a nation’s currency is the most important price in its economy. It 
not only influences the relative prices between its tradeable and nontradeable sectors, 
it influences in very important ways how the country relates to the rest of the 
international economy. This influence on how the economy relates to the global
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economy is important on both the current accounts and on the capital accounts. 
Ironically, both policy makers and many academic economists tend to neglect this 
important set of issues. We should recognize that we do so at our own risk.
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